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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
AUDREY E. MASTERS, 
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent, 
-vs.-
MAXINE LESEUER, 
Defenda.nt and Appellan,t. 
Case 
No. 9574 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
The instant appeal by defendant is from an order 
of the Third Judicial District Court denying the defend-
ant's motion to set aside the default judgment thereto-
fore entered by the Court in favor of plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The respondent commenced action against appellant 
for the recovery of certain real property wrongfully re-
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possessed by the appellant, upon claim by appellant that 
the respondent had failed to comply with the terms of a 
contract of sale of said real property from defendant to 
plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant's default was en-
tered and subsequently, after hearing before the Hon-
orable A. H. Ellett, a judgment was entered awarding 
the return of the property to plaintiff. Thereafter, the 
defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment which 
was heard before Judge Ellett, and the motion was 
denied. The defendant now appeals from the denial of 
that motion. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondent seeks the affirmance of the 
Trial Judge's refusal to set aside the judgment in favor 
of respondent. 
FACTS 
The respondent takes exception to the facts con-
tained in the appellant's brief. 1 
On May 26, 1961, the respondent filed an action, in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, against the 
appellant alleging the appellant had wrongfully repos-
sessed the property at 603-604 Cortez, Salt Lake City, 
which property the appellant agreed to sell the respond-
ent on January 9, 1959 (R-1). It was further alleged that 
respondent had made all payments required under the 
1 Appellant's brief contains no citation to the record in support of the 
"alleged facts." 
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contract to the date of repossession, November 7, 1960, 
and that subsequent tender of payments had been re-
jected by appellant (R-1). It was also alleged that sub-
sequent to repossession, the appellant's attorney had been 
contacted by respondent's attorney relative to an account-
ing, anct that after being assured that the information 
would be forthcoming, the appellant refused to provide 
such information (R-2). The record supports the failure 
of the appellant to supply the information requested, 
since at the hearing on the judgment (R-6), Mr. Richard 
Dewsnup, attorney for respondent prior to the ltigation, 
testified he had conversations with Norman Wade, appel-
lant's attorney, who agreed to supply the information on 
the accounting of the contract, and followed the conver-
sation with a letter confirming their previous discussion 
and setting out the information desired. (Exhibit 2, p. 
11 et. seq.; R-8) The- information was never supplied 
(R-8, 9), and a follow-up letter was sent on April 7, 
1961. (Exhibit 3, p. 11 et. seq.) Subsequent to the April 
7th letter, a conversation was had between Mr. Dewsnup 
and Mr. Wade wherein Mr_$. Dewsnup informed Mr. 
Wade that if he could not supply the information, a law 
suit would have to be filed. Mr. Wade indicated appellant 
was uncooperative, and the law suit was filed by re-
spondent (R-9). 
Summons was served on the appellant on the 7th day 
of July, 1961, (R-4, 5), and thereafter the appellant's de-
fault was entered on August 1, 1961, twenty-three 
days later. About a week after the appellant's de-
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fault was entered, Mr. Dewsnup saw Mr. Wade, appel-
lant's attorney, and the following took place (R-10): 
''Approximately two weeks ago, I saw him at the 
elevator in this building, and I asked him if he had 
had any further contact with Mrs. LeSeuer, be-
cause suit had been filed, and I asked him if he had 
been engaged to make any kind of an appearance, 
and his answer was rather vague. He said some-
thing to the effect that he ought to make an appear-
ance in it, and I advised him at that time that you 
were the one that was handling the action, that you 
had taken a default judgment, that you would prob-
ably resist the setting aside of the default, and that 
you were planning on bringing Mrs. Masters down 
from Washington within the near future to intro-
duce evidence in support of the default.'' 
Thereafter, on the 21st of August, 1961, a hearing for 
judgment upon the plaintiff's complaint was had before 
the Honorable A. H. Ellett (R-6). Evidence was present-
ed in support of the complaint through Mrs. Audrey E. 
Masters, respondent, a resident of Seattle, Washington, 
who journeyed from Washington to testify; through a 
Mr. Atkinson, a real estate agent; and from Nir. Dewsnup. 
Thereafter on the 24th day of August, 1961, the Court en-
tered judgment upon the evidence awarding return of the 
premises to the respondent and other relief ( R-1'7). 
On September 11, 1961, the appellant filed a motion 
to set aside the judgment (R-20), with an answer and an 
affidavit from the appellant's counsel, in support of the 
motion (R-21). The affidavit claimed that the reason no 
answer had been previously filed was that affiant thought 
that one had been filed, and was unaware that one had not 
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been filed, until his client notified him on September 1, 
1961, that judgment had been entered. A hearing was 
held on the appellant's motion to set aside the judgment 
on September 28, 1961, and the motion was denied by the 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, the same judge that had heard 
the evidence on plaintiff's complaint for judgment (R-23). 
The notice of appeal was filed by appellant on October 31, 
1961 ; the record on appeal was filed with this Court on 
December 8, 1961 ; and appellant's brief was filed on 
April 13, 1962. 
Further, the Appendix to this brief shows that sub-
sequent to the judgment in the District Court, the re-
spondent took possession of the premises at 603-604 Cor-
tez Street and made payments to a third party on the 
mortgage on said property to the present time. 
1\JRGUMENT 
The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discre-
tion in Denying the Appellant's Motion to Set 
Aside the Judgment Since: 
(A) Equity Required the Motion Be Denied. 
(B) Mistake, Inadvertence or Excusable 
Neglect Were Not Clearly Dem.on,strat-
ed to the Court. 
(A) Equity Required the Appellant's Motion Be Denied 
Rule 55, U. R. C. P. provides for the entry of default 
judgments. In accordance with 55 (b) (2) U. R. C. P., a 
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judgment of the nature taken in the instant case must be 
entered by the Court. In keeping with that mandate, the 
plaintiff upon full hearing before the trial judge (R-12), 
some twenty days after the appellant's default had been 
entered, was accorded judgment. The plaintiff, an elderly 
lady, resident of Seattle, Washington, came to Salt Lake 
City to give testimony. Two other witnesses were called 
and gave testimony. Prior to the time of the hearing, 
Mr. Dewsnup informed the appellant's attorney that a 
default had been entered, the attorney indicated he knew 
he ought to make an appearance and was informed that 
plaintiff intended to proceed to hearing and judgment 
(R-10). The defendant's attorney was further informed 
that Mrs. Masters would journey from Washington to 
Salt Lake for the purpose of testifying. The defendant did 
nothing, took no action to set aside the default, contact 
the plaintiff's attorney, or otherwise evidence an inter-
est in the case. It was not until over a month later, after 
judgment had been entered and plaintiff had been put to 
considerable time and expense, that the defendant made 
any effort to appear in the case. At that time, a motion 
to set aside the judgment was filed, based upon an affi-
davit which was directly contrary to the facts as testified 
to at the time of the judgment hearing (R-10, 21-22). 
Further, prior to the commencement of any action, 
the defendant's promises to supply information in sup-
port of an accounting were not kept (Exhibits 2 and 3), 
and the defendant's attorney indicated that defendant 
was recalcitrant and uncooperative. 
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Rule 55, U. R. C. P., provides that for good cause 
shown, a default may be set aside, but that a default judg-
ment is governed by Rule 60 (b), U. R. C. P. Thus, a 
firm distinction exists between the setting aside of a 
mere default, where only good cause need be shown, and 
disturbing a judgment. Teal v. King Farms Co., 21 F. R. 
Serv., 55 c. 1, Case 1 (1955). Rule 60 (b), U. R. C. P. 
sets out the instances when relief from final judgment is 
warranted. The over-all command of that rule is that 
the relief should only be granted ''in the furtherance of 
Justice.'' As has previously been noted by the Court, N ey 
v. Ha.rrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114 (1956), Rule 
60 (b) is similar to previous Utah statutes, 2 and hence 
earlier decisions of the Court under other statutes are 
valid precedent. 
It is clear that as a general rule, the trial judge to 
whom the motion is addressed has discretion to grant or 
deny relief from judgment. In Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 
354, 90 Pac. 897 ( 1907), this Court stated : 
''That the question whether a default mid judg-
ment should or should not be vacated is one to be 
passed on by the trial court, and that it rests 
within its sound discretion, has so often been de-
clared to be the rule of practice that it has become 
elementary, and needs no citation of authorities.'' 
Most recently the Court has affirmed the recognized 
rule, that the ''sound discretion'' of the trial judge should 
govern. Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P. 2d 594 
(1961). Before the appellate court would be warranted 
2 Comp. Laws, 1876 § 1293; Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3005; Comp. Laws, 1917, 
§ 6619; 104-14-4 Rev. Stat., 1933; 104-14-4 U. C. A., 1943. 
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in reversing the trial court's determination, an abuse of 
discretion must be shown. Thus, in Salt Lake Hardware 
Co. v. Neilson Lwnd & Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 Pac. 911 
(1913), the Court stated: 
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that we are not 
justified in interfering with and setting aside such 
an order as this, denying relief on alleged grounds 
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect, unelss an abuse of discretion is shown.'' 
In McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 300, 104 Pac. 
731 (1909), it was clearly stated: 
'' ... unless it is made to appear that such discre-
tion has been abused, the ruling of the Court va-
cating or refusing to vacate the judgment will 
not be disturbed on appeal." 
Thus, before the Court should act to set aside the 
trial court's order, it must appear that Judge Ellett 
abused his discretion in the matter, based upon the facts 
known to him in this particular case, Utah Commercial 
Ba,nk v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 199, 53 Pac. 1033 (1898). 3 
Where relief is to be granted, it is to be granted to 
effect justice. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 Pac. 908 
(1929). Thus, in a careful analysis of the Rule 60 (b) and 
the purposes for it, the Court noted in Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 711 (1953): 
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may 
3 "No general rule can be laid down respecting the discretion to be exer-
cised in setting aside or refusing to set aside a judgment by default . . . Each 
case must necessarily depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances . . ." 
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through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the 
presentation of a claim or defense [arise]. 
* * * 
''Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of 
justice and the Court will incline toward granting 
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party 
may have a hearing, Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 
276 P. 908. However, the mova;nt must show that 
he has used due diligence and that he was pre-
vented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he ha,d no control.' ' 4 (Emphasis supplied) 
The Utah precedent is fairly well marshaled in 
support of a position favoring liberality in granting 
relief from default judgments, and holding it to be an 
abuse of discretion not to so allow, where meritorious 
reasons are set out, and timely application is made there-
fore. Bylund v. Crook,. 60 Utah 285, 208 Pac. 504 (1922); 
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P. 2d 995 (1956); 
Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 2d 159, 298 P. 2d 821 (1956). How-
ever, an analysis of the cases, as against the facts of the 
instant case, clearly demonstrate that appellant is en-
titled to no relief. 
In Utah Commercial Barnk v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 
53 Pac. 1033 ( 1898), the Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default 
judgment. The affidavits in support of the motion were 
uncontradicted. In addition, defendant had made an ap-
pearance in the case to quash summons, which was 
denied. Thereafter, counsel withdrew, but defendant had 
4 Quoted with approval in Ney v. Harrison, supra. 
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no notice of withdrawal, but thereafter employed counsel 
and sought to defend the action. The case is substan-
tially at variance from the instant case. Here, defendant 
~ad first promised to furnish an accounting without trial, 
but refused to do so. Defendant, through counsel, was 
informed that a default had been taken and acknowledged 
that suit had been filed. Thereafter, being aware that 
plaintiff intended to proceed to judgment, no effort was 
made to enter the case. On this basis, the Trumbo case 
will not support relief from the trial court's discretion. 
In Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 99 Pac. 897 (1907), 
the Court again found an abuse of discretion in not set-
ting aside a default. But once again it clearly appeared 
that defendant sought to force the action, and was not 
dilatory in pursuing the court procedures. The facts 
of the Haycock case disclose that on the day for filing an 
answer the defendant's attorney left a demurrer at the 
office of plaintiff's attorney which due to the inadequacy 
of communication was not filed in the clerk's office until 
a few days later. The Supreme Court felt that in view 
of the remoteness of the defendant's attorney's office 
and the Court, plus the slight delay involved, the judg-
ment should have been set aside. The differences be-
tween that case and the instant situation are so obvious 
as not to· warrant mention. The case offers no support 
for the appellant's plea for relief. 
In Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908 (1929), the 
Supreme Court again granted relief as against the trial 
court's decision. But the basis upon which the relief was 
accorded is not present in the instant case, since subse- · 
10 
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quently, in Warren v. Dixon Rooch Co., 123 Utah 415, 
260 P. 2d 7 41 ( 1953), a case wherein the Court refused 
relief, it said in reference to the I-Iurd case: 
"In Hurd v. Ford, the reversal was based upon 
these considerations: a motion to make more defi-
nite had been filed within the time for answering, 
the default judgment for attorney's fees had been 
entered on an unliquidated amount and no evi-
dence of a reasonable fee had been taken, and fur-
ther the Court acted beyond its power in requir-
ing plaintiff to turn over documents in her pos-
session as a condition for vacating the judgment.'' 
From the Court's construction of the Hurd case, it's 
clear that it has no application to the instant situation. 
In the Warren v. Dixon Ranch case, supra, the Court fur-
ther said as to the basis for reversal of the I-I aycock 
case noted above: 
''In Cutler v. Haycock, a case decided in 1907, 
this Court reversed the trial court because it felt 
that in determining not to set aside the judgment 
the trial court had not exercised its discretion be-
cause of Peterson v. Crosier, and would otherwise 
have granted the motion inasmuch as plaintiff 
had used every possible means to present his de-
fense but was prevented by the physical difficul-
ties of communication in a sparsely -settled 
country.'' 
It can be clearly seen that something more than what 
is now before the Court is required in order to warrant 
setting aside a judgment in the interest of justice. 5 
5 In Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 2d 159, 298 P. 2d 821 (1956), the Court 
granted relief, but it was based upon Rule 60 (b) (6) not here involved. 
Thomas v. Moms, 8 Utah 284, 31 Pac. 446 (1892) involved granting relief 
from a default, but it was trial default since an answer had been filed. To the 
same effect is Machine Co. V. MtWchant, 11 Utah 68, 39 Pac. 483 ( 1895). 
11 
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An analysis of the cases in which the Court has re-
fused to grant relief clearly demonstrates that the instant 
fact situation fits that category. 
In Peterson v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860 
(1905), the Supreme Court refused to disturb the trial 
court's decision not to relieve defendant from a default. 
In the case, defendant had filed a demurrer to plaintiff's 
complaint which was overruled. Defendant also filed an 
answer, but failed to appear at trial. It was alleged that 
the neglect of plaintiff's attorney was partly responsible 
in the failure of the defendant to appear at trial. The 
Court in rejecting the claim stated: 
''The facts set out in appellant's affidavit wholly 
fail to bring the case within the foregoing provi-
sion of the statute [3005 R. S., 1898]. On the con-
trary, they tend to show a deliberate intention on 
his part to abandon his defense and permit plain-
tiff to take judgment against him. He and his 
counsel were advised that the case would be called 
for trial on the day for which it was set, and he 
must have known that, unless he appeared and 
made his defense or obtained a continuance, a 
judgment, in all probability would be rendered 
against him; but, instead of preparing and appear-
ing for trial, he showed an indifference which is 
wholly inexcusable.'' 
Parallels between this case and the instant case 
appear of record. Appellant was given full opportunity 
before suit to settle the case, but refused to cooperate. 
Thereafter, suit was commenced, and appellant had 
knowledge of the suit. After failure to file an answer, 
default was taken. Thereafter, the appellant's counsel 
12 
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was notified of the default, acknowledged the necessity 
of an appearance, but no effort was made to seek a stipu-
lation from counsel or remove the default. Not until well 
over a month after notice did the appellant seek relief. 
It could well be concluded that defendant did not desire 
to proceed with the action. Further, the fact that only de-
fendant's attorney was notified is no excuse, for the Court 
said in Peterson v. Crosier, supra (P. 245 Utah) : 
"But even if it be conceded that appellant's fail-
ure to appear and defend at the trial was due to 
the neglect of his attorney, it could avail him noth-
ing, for the rule is settled by the great weight of 
authority that 'the facts alleged must be incon-
sistent with the least neglect, incompetency or 
ignorance in the conduct of the suit on the part of 
the complainant, or on the part of his attorney or 
agent, the acts or omissions of whom are no more 
a ground for excuse than his own.' " (Emphasis 
supplied) 
In a similar case, McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293, 
104 Pac. 731 (1909), the Court refused to grant relief 
from default judgment where the defendant did not file 
an answer, and upon withdrawal of counsel, defendant's 
attorney was informed he would ''push the case,'' and 
thereafter default was taken. In the instant case, default 
judgment was not taken until from two to three weeks 
after the conversation with appellant's attorney in the 
elevator. A close paralled to the McWhirter case exists in 
the instant appeal. In denying relief, the Court said: 
'' ... a party ... must show that he has used due 
diligence to prepare and present his defense, and 
that he was either prevented from doing so because 
13 
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of some accident, misfortune, or circumstance 
over which he has no control; or that he has been 
misled or lulled into inaction by some agreement 
or act of the opposite party or his counsel upon 
which he had a right to rely. This appellant has 
wholly failed to do (Peterson v. Crosier, 29 Utah 
235, 81 Pac. 860). '' 
The words are equally apropos to the instant case. A 
case equally similar to the McWhirter case is Salt Lake 
Ha,rdwa.re Co. v. Neilson L(JJY/;.d & Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 
134 Pac. 911 (1913), again involving notice to the defend-
ant's attorneys, where the Supreme Court held the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion. See also Bylund v. 
Crook, 60 Utah 285, 208 Pac. 504 (1922), where the Court 
held the matter to be within the trial judge's discretion 
in not setting aside a default judgment. 
In Warren, v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 415, 260 P. 
2d 741 (1953), the Court refused relief, where an em-
ployee of a corporation failed to respond to the summons 
and answer, although the stockholders had no notice of 
the action. An answer was filed on first notice 64 days 
after default. 6 In this case, it will be recalled the Court 
set the limits of the precedents that had accorded relief. 
The Court said the case may he one in which it would have 
accorded relief, but made it clear that the matter was for 
the trial court's discretion saying: 
"This court will not substitute its discretion for 
that of the trial court in a case such as this.'' 
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P. 2d 995 
( 1956) is a case equally dispositive of the instant situa-
6 In the instant case, it was 42 days. 
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tion. The appellant in that case sought a Nevada di-
vorce, and claimed by affidavit that he had no notice of 
the trial setting. In sustaining the trial court's denial of 
relief, it was said: 
''At the hearing upon the motion to set aside the 
judgment neither plaintiff nor his Nevada attor-
ney appeared for cross-examination upon the facts 
alleged in their affidavits. His appeal seems to 
proceed upon the assumption that the Court was 
obliged to accept them as true, which is not the 
case." 
Further, the Court felt the record demonstrated 
an intent not to pursue the Utah action. The Court said: 
''Notwithstanding the policy of liberality in grant-
ing relief to persons against whom default judg-
ments have been taken when there has been ex-
cusable neglect, inadvertence or surprise, it is 
not to be forgotten that Rule 60 (b) under which 
such relief is granted states that the Court may 
relieve a party from a final judgment in the 'fur-
therance of justice.' Manifestly the Court should 
not follow the rule of indulgence toward the party 
in default when the effect would be to work an 
injustice or inequity upon the opposing party. A 
prime requisite precedent to the granting of such 
relief is that the movamt demonstrate that he 
comes to the Court with clean hands and in good 
faith. His entire conduct as disclosed by the rec-
ord negates this." (Emphasis supplied) 
Judge Ellett, who denied the appellant's motion for 
relief under Rule 60 (b), was the same judge who had 
heard the testimony offered at the hearing on the judg-
ment. Certainly he was not bound to accept the truthful-
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ness of the affidavit filed in support of the motion, where 
the record fully disclosed testimony to refute it. Chrysler 
v. Chrysler, supra. Further, he could, in the interest of 
justice, refuse to grant the relief where not to have done 
so would have worked an injustice on plaintiff. The rec-
ord contains no findings of the trial court upon which its 
denial was based, nor a record of the hearing, but in the 
absence of such a record it must be assumed that the 
order was supported by the evidence. In re Voorhees Es-
tate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961); Dahlberg v. 
Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 Pac. 214 (1930). Since the 
relief sought is equitable, to be accorded in the interest of 
justice, based upon the fair discretion of the trial judge, 
N ey v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114 (1956), it 
could harly be deemed an abuse of discretion to deny 
relief where plaintiff had endeavored to seek settlement 
prior to trial and defendant had been recalcitrant and 
refused to assist ; where no answer was filed although 
personal service was achieved; where subsequent to de-
fault, the' defendant's counsel acknowledged the action, 
admitted the need to file an answer, was apprised that 
plaintiff would be brought from Washington to testify 
for judgment unless action was taken, and thereafter did 
nothing; where judgment was taken after full hearing; 
where the time from notice of default till the motion to 
vacate was over a month's time; where the affidavit in 
support of the motion was in opposition to testimony re-
ceived at hearing; and finally, where plaintiff was put 
to the expense of traveling from Seattle to Salt Lake City 
to testify, plus the expenses of other witnesses being 
called and a full hearing being held. To allow the appel-
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lant relief would punish the respondent for being dili-
gent in the prosecution of the case, for abiding by the 
rules of procedure, and being fair in her treatment of 
the appellant. Only stark injustice would be the result, 
and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing 
to tolerate such a situation. 
Finally, it should he noted that several federal cases 
have made relief, in part, dependent upon the absence of 
intervening equities. Bridaux v. Eastern .Air Lines, Inc., 
19 F. R. Serv. 60 h. 29 Case 2, 214 F. 2d 207 (1954) ; 
Ellington v. Milne, 18 F. R. Serv. 60 b. 24 Case 1 (1953). 
A similar rule seems to follow from Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 2d 741 (1953). In the 
instant case, it is submitted that since during appeal the 
respondent has regained possession of the premises, 7 and 
made payments on the mortgage on the property, that 
this is another equity, which has intervened, warranting 
affirmance of the trial court's decision. 
It is submitted the Court should affirm the lower 
Court's order in the interest of justice. 
(B) Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neg-
lect Was Nat Shown Such as to Warrant Relief 
The sole basis for the claim for relief urged by the 
appellant, is that appellant's attorney thought that an 
answer had been filed, when it fact, none was filed. It is 
submitted that under Utah decisions, the neglect of the 
attorney of this nature will not suffice to warrant relief. 
The facts set out in the affidavit of appellant's attorney 
7 Defendant failed to file a supersedeas bond on appeal. See Appendix. 
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are almost identical with the facts in Ledwith v. Stotkan, 
6 F. R. Serv. 60 h. 24, Case 2, 2 FRD 530 (1942). In that 
case, the Federal Court refused relief saying: 
"It is manifest that facts here do not involve 
either mistake or surprise. If relief may be grant-
ed at all it must rest either upon 'inadvertence' 
or 'excusable neglect.' 
* * * 
''It may be added that while inadvertence and neg-
lect are not precisely identical in their cannota-
tions they are often classified as synonymous ... 
And :finally, though in the rule, and in the statutes 
underlying it, the word 'excusable' does not pre-
cede the word 'inadvertence' the pertinent deci-
sions deny relief on the ground of inadvertence 
unless it is actually excusable. 
''Precisely what circumstances will avail to ren-
der the neglect of counsel excusable may not be 
adequately set down. But some measure of ex-
cusability may be gotten from decisions where re-
lief has been granted. They include (a) contin-
uous preoccupation with the trial of a distracting 
:first degree murder case, (b) reliance on assur-
ance by the Court or a clerk thereof or opposing 
counsel as to the time of trial, (c) Failure to reach 
the place of trial in consequence of casual ties in 
traffic, (d) sudden illness of counsel, (e) unantici-
pated summons to the bedside of a dying relative, 
and other like incidents. In each instance there 
was inadvertence or neglect which intercepted 
the timely performance of a required act, but 
there was likewise some disturbing and distracting 
events which rendered the error excusable. 
''Inevitably, the argument of the defendant must 
proceed to the point where they assert, that having 
employed counsel for the protection of their inter-
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ests, they did all that could be expected of them 
and are entitled to absolution from responsibility 
for their attorney's negligence. But that seems not 
to be a tenable position, for by the weight of au-
thority the negligence of counsel in this behalf 
is imputed to his client." 
The Utah cases have followed the same reasoning. 
Thus, in Peterson v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860 
(1905) at p. 245, the Court held that the negligence of 
defendant's attorney was no excuse where the attorney 
failed to appear. See infra p. 13. In Salt Lake Hardware 
Co. v. Neilson, La;nd & Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 Pac. 
911 ( 1913), the Court again refused relief where the basis 
was an attorney's neglect. 
A substantial number of federal cases have said that 
where an attorney, without other reason, does not file 
an answer so that default is taken that relief is not neces-
sarily to be given from a judgment. Rutla;nd Tra;nsit 
Compa.ny v. Chicago TU~Y~N~,el Terminal Co., 233 F. 2d 655 
(1956); Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dalrymple, 
24 FRD 260 (D.C. Pa., 1959); Federal Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Frank Allbritton Motors, Inc., 16 FRD 109 (D. C. Mo., 
1954); Frank v. New Amsterda.m Casualty Co., 27 FRD 
258 (D. C. Pa., 1961). 
The same rule is accepted by the Restatement of 
Judgments, § 126 (f), which states that equitable relief 
from a judgment will be denied where : 
"the negligence of the attorney, agent, trustee or 
other representative of the present complainant 
prevented a fair trial.'' 
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The same conclusion for mistake of counsel is found 
in the same section, subsection (e). In commenting on 
relief from judgments, the Restatement of Judgments, p. 
616, gives the following example under Section 126 (f): 
"7. A brings an action against B who notifies his 
attorney, C, to defend the case. C negligently for-
gets to defend the case for B and judgment is 
given for A by default. Neither B nor C learn of 
the judgment until it is too late to take further 
proceedings in the action. Equitable relief will not 
be gra.n,ted." (Emphasis supplied) 
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P. 
2d 741, 743 (1953), Section 126 of the Restatement of 
Judgments was cited with approval. 
It is submitted therefore that even if the appellant's 
attorney's affidavit were correct in all particulars that 
appellant would not be entitled to relief, and where the 
fact of contradicting testimony is considered, it is clear 
there was not abuse of discretion in denying relief under 
Rule 60 (b), U. R. C. P. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's position that relief should be grant-
ed under Rule 60 (b) is not sustainable under the facts 
of this case. The instant situation is far more aggravated 
than those wherein the Courts have reversed the trial 
judge. Taking into consideration the equities, it appears 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
clear that an injustice will result unless the trial court 
is affirmed. Certainly it cannot be said that there was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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APPENDIX 
AFFIDAVIT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
STATE OF UTAH _ ss. 
I, Ronald N. Boyce, attorney for Mrs. Audrey E. 
Masters, do depose and swear that subsequent to the 
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in the 
case of Audrey E. Masters v. Maxine LeSeuer, and while 
the same was pending on appeal before the Utah Supreme 
Court as Case No. 957 4, the plaintiff took possession of 
the premises at 603-604 Cortez Street, Salt Lake City, 
State of Utah, sometime in the last part of the month of 
January, 1962. This was done since the defendant, Max-
ine LeSeuer did not desire to file a supersedeas bond on 
appeal. 
Since that time, to the best of my knowledge and 
upon information and belief, any rents from the rental 
of the premises have been applied to the mortgage against 
said property. 
/S/ RONALD N. BOYCE 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of 
May, 1962. 
(SEAL) /S/ DAVID K. WINDER 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: April 16, 1963. 
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